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Sustainability in the food and the pharmaceutical industry 
has become a hot topic as the several cases of 
malpractice reported by worldwide media in recent years 
shows. This research aims at identifying the reasons for 
the diffusion of non-ethically sustainable practices in these 
sectors, by evaluating the effectiveness of the company’s 
internal controls. To achieve this aim, a content analysis 
was performed considering the largest European 
pharmaceutical and food companies, listed on one or more 
of the main stock exchanges. Main findings underline 
many internal controls’ vulnerabilities to corruption. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The majority of worldwide food and pharmaceutical companies guarantee the integrity and 
safety of their products in order to obtain the consumers’ confidence, by assuring the most 
relevant interest for people, that is safeguarding human health. Despite the above stated 
commitment, from the last century, widespread economic and geographic food fraud and 
pharmaceutical scandals occurred ever more frequently, with a great impact on consumers’ 
health. 
 
Considering the significant relevance of human health in generating malpractice, the 
possible governance measures to be implemented to combat corruption should be analysed 
at all relevant levels (institutions, research centres, management and corporate policy 
makers, etc.), especially after taking into account forecasts about demographic and 
environmental development. According to the most recent estimates carried out by the 
United Nations and the Washington University, the worldwide population could reach 9 
billion in 2050 and it could grow potentially to 11 billion by the end of the century, in case no 
corrective measures1 are promptly adopted. 
 
The above stated forecast is strictly linked to: the exploitation of the world’s resources; 
economic development; environmental and food sustainability; the awareness of all players 
involved in the process aimed at ensuring the planet’s safety; the next generation’s health. 
The whole food system (starting from the agricultural processes up to the industrial and 
commercial chain) is involved in an important challenge to radically increase food production 
and, at the same time, to completely change the way it is produced. According to current 
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trends, food demand could increase by 70% by 2050 following demographic and economic 
growth. 
 
Considering the above mentioned forecasts, Governments and food companies are 
concerned about the way of coping with the forecasted demographic growth whose 
sustainability is greatly influenced by the current availability of resources and especially by 
the probability of conservation of these resources over the coming years. The above 
mentioned forecast about demographic development and the population’s increased age 
(especially in the industrialised countries) due to better nutrition, sanitation, healthcare, 
education and economic well-being are relevant factors impacting on the pharmaceutical 
sector. In detail, the increased number of elderly people implies on the one hand, a rising 
demand for pharmaceuticals and, on the other hand, the risk of corruption due to the wide 
economic interests involved. Potential unethical conduct in the pharmaceutical sector could 
significantly damage the population as the relevance of the pharmaceutical industry is 
mainly linked to the specific need the sector has in coping with human health. Access to 
drugs is often about life and death; because pharmaceuticals have curative and therapeutic 
qualities, they cannot simply be regarded as ordinary commodities. In order to combat 
corrupt practices, companies should implement effective and sound control systems, 
according to specific principles such as transparency, global responsibility, sustainability, 
compliance with laws and regulations. 
 
Considering the increasing diffusion of corruption in the food and pharmaceutical industries, 
the present study is aimed at verifying if malpractice and non-sustainable practices are due 
to the ineffectiveness of internal controls; in this regard the research question inspiring the 
study is the following: 
 
Why is there corruption even when internal control systems are implemented? Are the 
internal controls the weakest link in the corporate anti-corruption system? 
 
A review of international business literature – as reported in paragraph 2 – suggests that 
existing studies have focused typically on specific aspects of corruption and sustainability, 
without them being related to internal controls. In fact, sparse attention has been given to 
the internal control’s contribution in preventing and combating corruption in both the food 
and the pharmaceutical sector. There is a lack of scholarly research concerning the potential 
reduction of corruption in case of sound and effective internal control systems in food and 
pharmaceutical companies. This study attempts to fill this gap and add to the existing 
research through a content analysis aimed at evaluating the internal controls implemented 
by selected European food and pharmaceutical companies. 
 
This paper is structured as follows, Section 2 shows a literature review on corruption, 
sustainability and internal controls; it also provides a general background in terms of main 
corruption weaknesses of the selected sectors. Section 3 describes the research approach. 
Section 4 deals with the main results of the present research and the last section contains 
some concluding remarks, trying to answer the above mentioned question. 
 
2. Literature Review and Theoretical Background 
 
In recent years, the emergence of new sustainable development's paradigms aimed at 
stakeholder relationship management (Steurer et al, 2005 and Cassano et al, 2014) 
prompted the emphasis on interdependence in stakeholder relationship management and 
the integration of economic, social and environmental responsibility (Porter and Teisberg, 
2006; Esty and Winston, 2008; Przychodzen and Przychodzen, 2013 and Eccles et al, 
2014). The importance of sustainability has also led to numerous interventions by major 
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international institutions and companies. This has led them to increase their focus on the 
adoption of methods and tools of governance and control to help improving not only the 
economic performance but also the social and the ecological ones (Cassano et al, 2014). 
 
However, even though the focus of European legislation is very detailed on the safety of 
food (including the checks and tests carried out in specific areas for residues and 
contaminants in food and feed), an actual corrective intervention program on food fraud is 
still completely absent. The food scandals observed in recent years and future expectations 
for world economy, would suggest more and more attention for the topic; for this purpose, 
some measures are being studied and shown in the European Action Plan to strengthen the 
rules and controls in Member States in order to combat food fraud. 
 
The recent worldwide food scandals underline the level of urgency for corrective action and 
control in the sector in terms of regulation and governance, and, at the same time, they 
express the system’s exasperation with respect to the wrong policy choices. Thus, for 
example, there is the presence of horsemeat in bovine products (in response to the limitless 
demands for animal products). Likewise, melamine has been found in milk and milk powder 
for infants in levels exceeding the legal limits (emphasising the diversity of regulations in the 
various Member States). Chilli powder has been adulterated by introducing Sudan dyes with 
harmful effects to consumers’ health (highlighting the need to raise consciousness about the 
continued use of abusive advertising in promoting "beautiful" rather than "healthy" food). 
 
In spite of its high relevance, there is mounting evidence of increasing corruption in the 
pharmaceutical sector too (Almici and Gandini, 2014), even when a Code of ethics is 
adopted (Salvioni et al, 2015); indeed, the European Commission estimates that € 120 billion 
is lost to corruption each year throughout the 27 member States (Nielsen, 2013), while 
approximately 56 billion euros are lost annually to fraud and corruption in the health sector 
(Gee et al, 2011). In addition, many scandals relating to corrupt practices in the 
pharmaceutical sector have been reported by worldwide media in recent years. Without 
assuming any responsibility regarding their truthfulness, it is worth mentioning – as some 
examples – the case of GlaxoSmithKline, involved in a criminal investigation in Poland in 
2014 for bribing doctors to promote its lung drug Seretide and AstraZeneca accused of 
making kickbacks (Tobin, 2013). 
 
The above stated evidence is mainly due to specific sector features that combine in ways 
that systematically create opportunities for corrupt practices, while making it difficult to 
ensure the transparency and accountability that would inhibit this (Transparency 
International, 2006; Vian, 2007 and Almici, 2015). In detail, asymmetry of information and 
the “Principal-agent” relationship are the main factors promoting corrupt practices by 
healthcare providers against patients or the reimbursement system. In this regard, 
corruption may take the form of bribery in the provision of medical services, undue 
reimbursement claims, fraud and embezzlement. The complexity of the medicines’ chain 
and the high number of players involved create several opportunities for corruption, 
especially where authorisation (corruption in marketing authorisation), procurement 
(procurement corruption) and marketing processes (improper marketing relationships) are 
concerned.  
 
Corruption in marketing authorisation may occur, for example, in the authorisation stage in 
paying government officials to register drugs without the requisite information; deliberately 
delaying the registration of a pharmaceutical product to favour market conditions for another 
supplier; slowing down the registration procedures to solicit payment from a supplier (Gale, 
2011). Procurement corruption may take place in all phases of the procurement process 
including pre-bidding (corruptive needs assessment, circumvention of tender procedures, 
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tailored tendering), the bidding (bribery and kickbacks during the bid evaluation; favouritism; 
collusion and/or market division in bidding) and the post bidding ones (false invoicing, 
changing contract agreements) (Di Tella and Savedoff, 2001).  
 
With reference to both the food and the pharmaceutical sector, a review of the international 
literature underlines that the existing studies have focused either on a) the effects of 
corruption on economic growth (Husted, 1999; Mauro, 1995; Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2001; 
Akhter, 2004; Gonzalez-Velasquez, 2004; Serra, 2006 and Guetat, 2006) or on b) the 
analysis of the  causes of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; 
Collier, 2002; Sandholtz and Gray, 2003; Park, 2003; Aggarwala and Goodell, 2009 and 
Goldsmith, 2009) and on the related measures (Lancaster and Montiloa, 1997; Eigen, 2002; 
Svensson, 2005; Spector et al, 2005; Kaufman et al, 2008 and Graycar et al, 2010). Only a 
few studies analyse the effect of corruption on the food and health sector (McPake et al, 
1999; Gupta et al, 2002; Azfar, 2005; Cohen et al, 2002; Salvioni et al, 2015 and Almici, 
2015) or other specific issues such as market segmentation for genetically modified food 
and pharmaceuticals (Nonis and Hudson, 2013), while almost no authors have studied the 
role of internal controls for combatting corruption and, thus, promoting sustainability. This 
research aims at filling the above mentioned literature gap, by verifying the actual internal 
control practices of selected European companies through a content analysis. More 
precisely, the present study tests the following assumption: 
 
A:  Corruption in food and pharmaceutical sectors is also due to the ineffectiveness of 
internal controls. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
In order to answer the above research question, a content analysis (Weber, 1990; 
Neuendorf, 2002 and Krippendorff, 2004) is carried out considering the top twenty largest 
European food and pharmaceutical companies by operating revenue, listed on one or more 
of the main stock exchanges in December 2014 and with a functioning website. The 
company selection – considering only the parent companies - makes use of Amadeus 
database and refers to: 
 
- Class 10 - Manufacture of food products – and class 11 - Manufacture of beverages; 
- Class 21 – Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations, as revised in 2008.  
 
Even if the research’s aim is to verify whether there is a direct connection between controls 
and corrupt practices in selected sectors, not all the selected companies have been involved 
in scandals relating to corruption; indeed, in the present research, unethical behaviour is 
seen generally as a trend characteristic of the analysed sectors. The content analysis is 
carried out on the last annual report for all companies and also on the compliance programs, 
provided as a separate document, for any food companies and for 11 pharmaceutical 
companies; the processed data are those disclosed on the companies’ website thorough the 
annual report or the compliance program. 
 
To check the effectiveness of internal (especially compliance) controls the content analysis 
focuses on the following aspects: 
 
- The disclosure via website of the company’s Code of ethics and the Code of conduct. 
- The implementation of a corporate compliance program, focusing on its adoption, related 
procedures and governance bodies’ involvement. 
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- The internal control process. 
- The internal control bodies involved in the implementation of anti-bribery monitoring 
activities. 
- The communication process between internal control bodies. 
 
More precisely, the information disclosed by the selected companies is collected in an Excel 
database created according to the most relevant international guidelines such as the OECD 
Recommendation for further Combating Foreign Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (2009) and the OECD Good practice guidance on 
internal controls, ethics and compliance (2010). In this regard, the analysis compares the 
compliance controls actually implemented with the international regulation’s 
recommendations. 
 
4. Results 
 
The analysis is carried out on companies’ compliance programs, annual reports, code of 
conduct and code of ethics, with regard to the above international guidelines. International 
guidelines recommend the implementation – in all companies controlled by the parent – of 
a compliance program to prohibit bribery in any form (direct or indirect). This document 
should include detailed policies and procedures that address: conflict of interest, bribes in 
any form, political contributions, prohibition or facilitation payments, gifts, hospitality and 
travel expenses. 
 
The board of directors as well as the CEO should be responsible for ensuring the compliance 
program’s implementation; at the same time, top-level management should be involved in 
this activity. International guidelines also recommend the implementation of a widespread 
compliance control process, such as risk management and internal audits involving internal 
control bodies. Moreover, compliance controls should be carried out by specific bodies such 
as the compliance committee, the compliance officer and the supervisory committee 
introduced in Italy through Legislative Decree 231/2001. Companies should also implement 
an effective line of communication between the internal control bodies and the employees. 
The implementation of a whistleblowers protection policy is also recommended. 
 
Table 1: Code of ethics and Code of conduct disclosure 
  Code of ethics % 
Code of 
conduct 
% 
Pharmaceutical 7 35% 13 65% 
Food 4 20% 10 50% 
 
Data shown in Table 1 refers to the website disclosure of the company’s adoption of the 
Code of ethics and/or the Code of conduct, both of them including a general statement 
regarding implementation of ethical principles. With reference to the selected companies in 
the pharmaceutical industry, 7 out of 20 adopt and publish their Code of ethics, while 13 out 
of 20 disclose their Code of conduct; companies that disclose their Code of conduct 
outnumber those of the Code of ethics. This datum only indicates the extent the above 
documents are disclosed; furthermore, it is possible that some companies adopt these 
codes without publishing them. On the contrary, in the food industry, 7 out of 20 companies 
adopt neither the Code of ethics nor the Code of conduct (or do not give information about 
them). Among the companies analysed, only one has both a Code of ethics and a Code of 
conduct; the other 13 companies mainly adopt the Code of Conduct. 2 out of 10 companies 
declare their adoption of the Code of conduct without publishing it on their website. 
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Table 2: Compliance program’s adoption and its extent 
  
Compliance 
program’s adoption 
% 
Adoption in all 
the subsidiaries 
% 
Pharmaceutical 18 90% 15 75% 
Food 12 60% 11 55% 
 
Table 2 summarises the results on the adoption of the compliance program by the selected 
companies: in the pharmaceutical sector, almost all of them (18 out of 20) implement a 
compliance program and 15 out of 20 adopt the same compliance policy for all their 
subsidiaries. With regard to the disclosure’s source, 10 out of 18 companies publish their 
compliance program as a separate document with respect to the annual report, while only 
one company provides the compliance program in the annual report; 7 companies do not 
provide any indication about the disclosure’s source. 
 
The majority of food companies have a compliance program (60%): however, compliance 
program diffusion is significantly higher in pharmaceutical companies (90%). 7 out of 12 food 
companies provide compliance program guidelines in their annual report, while the 
remaining 5 companies provide them in other documents. 11 out of 12 companies implement 
the compliance program throughout all subsidiaries. 
 
Table 3: Compliance program’s policies and procedures 
  Compliance program           
  
Conflict 
of 
interest 
% 
Bribes 
in any 
form 
% 
Political 
contributions 
% 
Prohibition 
or 
facilitation 
payments 
% 
Gift, 
hospitality 
and travel 
expenses 
% 
Pharmaceutical 3 17% 6 33% 2 11% 3 17% 3 17% 
Food 10 83% 12 100% 4 33% 5 42% 11 92% 
 
With reference to the compliance program’s policies and procedures, the disclosure is very 
low; on average, only 4 out of 18 pharmaceutical companies publish this information, 
focusing on bribes in general (Table 3). Otherwise, little attention is given to the other areas 
such as “conflict of interest”, “political contributions”, “prohibition or facilitation payments”, 
“gift, hospitality and travel expenses”. Thus, results shown in Table 6 show, on the one hand, 
a too limited focus of compliance programs and, on the other hand, the need for major 
improvements.  
 
As in the pharmaceutical companies, in food companies, compliance programs focus mainly 
on corruption in general. However, it seems that food companies give more prominence to 
"conflict of interest" and "gifts, hospitality and travel expenses"; otherwise, disclosures 
relating to "political contributions" and "payments" remain low. 
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Table 4: Board of directors, CEO and Management’s involvement in the compliance 
program’s implementation 
  
Board of 
directors’ 
commitment 
% 
CEO’s 
commitment 
% Management’s commitment 
     
Development 
of bribery 
prevention 
procedures 
 
Key-
decision 
making 
 
Communication 
of the anti-
bribery stance 
 
Pharmaceutical 6 33% 7 39% 8 44% 7 39% 6 33% 
Food 8 67% 4 33% 5 42% 6 50% 5 42% 
 
Table 4 underlines a low disclosure level with reference to the above stated aspects; on 
average, in the pharmaceutical companies only 7 out of 18 provide information about the 
governance bodies’ commitment in the compliance program’s implementation. With 
reference to the disclosing companies, collected data show a general governance bodies’ 
commitment, especially with regard to the CEO and management whose commitment is to 
the development of bribery prevention procedures, and key decisions concerning bribery 
and the communication of the anti-bribery stance. 11 out of 12 food companies provide 
information about governance bodies’ commitment in the compliance program; the data 
collected show that the board is primarily responsible for the compliance program’s 
implementation, followed by management. 
 
Table 5: Compliance control process 
  
Checks 
over 
accounting 
and record 
keeping 
Internal 
controls 
regular 
review 
Control of 
all functions 
impacting 
on financial 
transactions 
Introduction 
of a fraud 
risk 
assessment 
Development 
of a risk 
assessment 
process 
including a 
review of 
specific 
deficiencies 
Segregation 
of duties 
Monitoring 
of bribery 
prevention 
procedures 
Pharmaceutical 18 90% 19 95% 19 95% 19 95% 16 80% 0 0% 12 60% 
Food 5 25% 15 75% 9 45% 12 60% 19 95% 0  0% 3 15% 
 
Results concerning the practices carried out with regard to the above stated aspects are 
shown in Table 5: almost the totality of the selected pharmaceutical companies are 
compliant with the international recommendations, focusing on the implementation of regular 
reviews of internal controls and of fraud risk assessment, as well as on specific checks on 
functions impacting on financial transactions. 
 
The data collected in the food companies shows a high diffusion of reviews of internal 
controls and risk assessment; however, there is limited focus on specific anti-corruption 
controls ("checks over accounting and record keeping" and "monitoring of bribery prevention 
procedures"). 
 
Table 6: Appointed compliance control bodies  
  
Compliance 
officer 
% 
Compliance 
committee 
% 
Risk 
manager 
% 
Internal 
audit 
% 
Supervisory 
committee 
(L.D. 
231/2001) 
% 
Pharmaceutical 8 40% 4 20% 6 30% 14 70% 2 10% 
Food 2 10% 2 10% 18 90% 12 60% 3 15% 
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Table 7: Compliance officer and Compliance committee’s composition and function 
  Pharmaceutical % Food % 
Compliance officer (Co)     
Holding a managerial position 8 100% 1 50% 
Disclosure of duties and functions 4 50% 1 
50% 
Supervision of Co’s activity 8 100% - - 
Compliance officer Committee 
(Coc) 
   
 
Separate committee 3 75% 1 50% 
Members 
3 75% - - 
(Chief Compliance 
officer, Chief financial 
officer, heads of legal 
affairs, internal audit 
and corporate 
compliance 
departments 
 (Audit 
committee) 
 
Meetings’ frequency - - - - 
Disclosure of duties and functions 3 75% 2 100% 
Coc’s Chairman - - - - 
Oversight of Coc’s activity 1 25% 2 100% 
 
Table 8: Risk manager, internal audit and Supervisory committee’s (LD 231/2001) 
composition and function 
  Pharmaceutical % Food % 
Internal audit     
Disclosure of duties and functions 12 86% 12 100% 
Involvement in the compliance 
program’s implementation 
7 50% 7 58% 
Supervision of internal audit’s 
activity 
14 100% 12 100% 
Risk manager     
Disclosure of duties and functions 6 100% 17 94% 
Involvement in the compliance 
program’s implementation 
2 33% 8 44% 
Supervision of risk management’s 
activity 
4 67% 17 94% 
Supervisory Committee (L.D. 
231/2001) 
    
Disclosure of duties and functions 2 100% 3 100% 
Involvement in the compliance 
program’s implementation 
2 100% 3 100% 
Supervision of Supervisory 
Committee’s activity 
2 100% 3 100% 
 
Tables 7 and 8 show the evidence related to the composition and function of the above 
stated bodies, while Table 6 shows data about the appointment of these bodies. The internal 
audit function is the most widespread in the selected pharmaceutical companies, as it is 
present in all the 14 disclosing companies; whereas the compliance committee is the least 
present (only 4 companies out of 14). Compliance officers and risk managers are not 
widespread; only 8 companies out of 14 and 6 companies out of 14 respectively (Table 6). 
In this sense, the presence of compliance control bodies (compliance officer and compliance 
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committee) is weak and should be strengthened. With regard to their composition and 
function, data shown in Table 7 underline that the compliance officer’s functions are 
disclosed in only 4 companies out of 8, while in all 8 companies, the compliance officer’s 
activity is subject to the other body’s supervision (generally that of the Board of directors). 
Otherwise, the compliance committee’s activity is subject to the Board of directors’ control 
just in one case; no information is provided regarding the chairman or the meeting’s 
frequency, while data concerning the composition indicate that – in general – the body is a 
separate committee comprising the heads of specific compliance functions. 
 
In the food companies, risk management and internal audit are the most involved 
compliance bodies; the Supervisory Committee is present in all three Italian companies. As 
for the pharmaceutical companies, there is a low presence of specific compliance bodies 
(Compliance officer and Compliance committee).Compliance officer disclosure is very low 
as just one company gives information about this role; with regard to the Compliance 
committee, one of the two companies has a separate committee, while the other has an 
Audit and Compliance Committee. This seems to confirm the involvement of “traditional” 
control bodies in the implementation of compliance programs. 
 
Table 8 shows data about the other internal control bodies supporting compliance activities, 
such as the risk manager, the internal auditor and – with reference to Italian companies – 
the supervisory board introduced by Legislative Decree 231/2001. With regard to the internal 
auditor, in all the 14 disclosing companies in the pharmaceutical industry, its activity is 
controlled by the Board of directors or the Audit committee, while its involvement in the 
compliance program’s implementation is only reported in 7 companies. Evidence about risk 
management underlines a lesser involvement in compliance’s implementation; only 2 
companies out of 6 confirm this aspect, while supervision of its activity is carried out in almost 
all the companies with a risk management function.  
 
No weaknesses are reported with regard to Legislative Decree 231/2001’s Supervisory 
Board appointment in just the two selected Italian companies; indeed, for both companies, 
collected data underline the body’s involvement in the compliance program’s implementation 
and the supervision of its activity. In the food companies, the Supervisory committee is 
always involved in the compliance program’s implementation; however, internal audit and 
risk management involvement is lower: if present, these bodies are involved in about 50% 
of the companies. 
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Table 9: Compliance controls communication process 
  Pharmaceutical % Food % 
Presence of an effective line of 
communication between the 
compliance officer and the 
employees 
5 63% 1 100% 
Presence of an effective line of 
communication between the 
compliance officer and the 
compliance committee 
3 75% - - 
Presence of an effective line of 
communication among the 
compliance control bodies 
6 30% 12 60% 
Internal and external 
communication includes: 
        
a commitment to carry on business 
fairly, honestly and openly 
16 80% 13 65% 
a commitment to zero tolerance 
towards bribery 
16 80% 12 60% 
the consequences of breaching 
policies 
13 65% 7 35% 
the bribery prevention procedures in 
place, including any protection for 
confidential reporting of bribery 
(whistle-blowing) 
15 75% 10 50% 
the business benefits of rejecting 
bribery  
- - 2 10% 
the players involved in the 
development and implementation of 
bribery’s prevention procedures 
15 75% 11 55% 
Presence of a secure and 
accessible channel through which 
employees can raise concern 
without risk of reprisal 
(whistleblowers protection policy) 
14 70% 8 40% 
 
Table 9 shows that in 5 pharmaceutical companies out of 8, there is an effective line of 
communication between the compliance officer and the employees, while the presence of a 
line of communication between the compliance officer and the compliance committee is 
evident in 3 out of 4 companies. Collected data underline a low degree of communication if 
the focus is on the internal control bodies as only 6 out of 20 companies confirm the 
presence of effective communication processes. Otherwise, with regard to communication, 
there is real evidence that the majority of the selected companies comply with the 
international guidelines (on average, 15 out of 20 companies). A similar result is reported by 
data concerning the implementation of a whistleblowers policy, as 14 out of 20 companies 
ensure the presence of a secure and accessible channel through which employees can raise 
concern without risk of reprisal. 
 
The selected food companies give little information about the communication between 
compliance bodies; however, there is a broader disclosure on the other control bodies, for 
which the companies declared the presence of communication. With regard to internal and 
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external compliance communication, the majority of the companies observe the principles 
of fairness and honesty and of zero-tolerance towards corruption. In 8 out of 20 companies 
there is a channel through which employees can raise concern without risk of reprisal. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this study, the compliance controls of the selected companies have been analysed in 
order to verify whether corruption in the above sectors is due to a potential ineffectiveness 
of internal control systems. This research is, thus, aimed at verifying whether the compliance 
controls in place are actually suitable for preventing malpractice, or else, their weakness 
facilitates the spread of corruption. The collected data are those disclosed by the selected 
companies; in this regard, research results are, thus, influenced by the company’s attitude 
to disclosure.  
 
Indeed, our study is limited by the informative source of our comparisons. The future 
development of our work intends to overcome such limitations by attempting to validate the 
results through a direct comparison with the management of the analysed companies 
(preparation and dispatch of a survey). Another of our study’s limitations is that it is only 
based on a content analysis. On the basis of the evidence shown in Section 4, it is possible 
to observe, in both selected sectors, a general vulnerability of internal controls to corrupt 
practices. Indeed, evidence highlights that even if the selected sectors are highly regulated, 
the implementation of internal control systems should be greatly improved. In this sense, 
results underline a contrast between the law makers’ great attention in regulating the food 
and the pharmaceutical chains and what companies actually do. Therefore, the findings 
highlight that the lever of success for the affirmation of the companies is represented, once 
more, by the strength of the entrepreneurial culture and from the structured system of laws 
and procedures. 
 
In other terms, especially in the last decade, laws and procedures are the answer to 
malpractice in the business world. However, in the light of the findings and in answer to our 
research question, we highlight that the adoption of behaviour in line with the healthy 
principles of management is subordinate to corruption. The adoption of the stakeholder 
theory necessarily brings about the adoption of transparent policies, strategies and forms of 
control and the social responsibility of the management. Only if such conditions are met and 
implemented by the leadership, can we affirm that the introduction of the control system is 
effectively to direct and to verify the business conduct to achieve the objectives. It aims to 
bridge the gap found in literature for which almost no authors have studied the role of internal 
controls for combatting corruption and, thus, promoting sustainability. 
 
The above findings demonstrate that unethical practices in the food and pharmaceutical 
sectors are also due to internal control weaknesses. Therefore, an effective fight against 
malpractice requires, on one hand, a general improvement of the monitoring activities 
actually implemented by the food and pharmaceutical companies; but on the other hand, to 
increase management training for the growth of the enterprise culture. In this sense, this 
paper is relevant to modern business administration studies as it offers food for thought for 
the real effectiveness of the control systems. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 The main corrective proposals under evaluation consider a greater investment in health and education 
(school enrolment rate) to allow women to have more decisional power about their lifestyle, with a slowing 
down effect on demographic increase. 
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